Encreased trade between the US and the USER would probably not provide encouncies securities to either nountry. Soviet leaders, while securingly amenable to some increase in trade, cannot be expected to allow the USER to become dependent to any great extent on markets or sources of supply over which they have little or no control. They would probably exercise great discretion over expansion of trade with the US, in particular restricting Soviet exports to items that would not significantly affect the strategic power of the US. Envertheless, both countries would probably benefit from an expansion of trade within the limits that devict leaders conceivably would allow. For example, the US might benefit by importing Soviet mangement or industrial machinery of advanced design while the USER might gain by importing American consumer goods or industrial machinery. On the whole, it appears that the modest gains remitting from an expansion of trade would accrue more to the USER than to the US.

As an information rather than a policy-forming agency of the Executive Branch, I may only point out the tempible results of the extension of American economic aid to Poland. It is our judgment that American aid to Poland, even though only a fraction of that extended by the USSR, has atrengthened Genulka's landership in Poland. Genulka is a Communist, but he is a person who has had the courage to question the absolute hagement of Mussian Leadership. His leadership owns much of its success to its solility to hold out hope for freez political, economic and social institutions to non-Communist Poles them though the Genulka regime itself would be hesitant to initiate such reforms.

The USER has sufficient economic strength to sustain a large foreign nowistance program as long as Soviet londers choose to 60 30. Although the Soviet Gross Sational Product is only about \$170 million (approximately 40 percent that of the US), Soviet planners allocate a relatively small fraction of available goods and services to communers. The USER is already devoting almost as much of its annual output as the US to such things as capital formation, armounts, and foreign mealstance. Thus, because of the low living standards in the USER, a foreign assistance program equal in size to that of the US, would not seriously deter the continued development of the Soviet occnomy. However, production levels in the USER are expending rapidly and should enable Soviet leaders—if they choose in the future—simultaneously to spend more than the US is now spending on foreign aid, defense, and military research and development, and achieve limited gains for individual consumption.